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Sense and Descriptions

Samantha is Samantha

Samantha is Charly

Samantha Caine

Suburban homemaker and the ideal mom to her 8 year old daughter Caitlin. She lives in a New England small town, teaches in a local school and makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

Charly Baltimore

a highly trained secret agent and cold-blooded killer involved in the government's most unscrupulous affairs.

It is perhaps tempting to think of senses as descriptions ... at least, this way you can see how sense fulfils the three functions given on the previous slide

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

‘all that anyone has been able to think of is that different [i.e. senses] are a matter of different descriptions being associated with the signs.

Some other views have been tried ... But these ideas have not been found compelling’

Campbell, 2011 p. 340

I wish someone had told me this before. I have the sense that the answer was out there and I could not find it.
‘all that anyone has been able to think of is that different modes of presentation [i.e. senses] are a matter of different descriptions being associated with the signs. Some other views have been tried, such as those that say all uses of co-referential terms in a single discourse must be anaphorically linked. But these ideas have not been found compelling’ \citep[p.~340]{campbell:2011_visual}.
This isn’t an argument ... we can do better
Is this correct?

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

Contrast that utterance of ‘Charly is Charly’ with the utterance ‘Charly is Samantha’

ftbe: These may differ in informativeness.

Terminology: call whatever aspect of meaning explains the difference ‘sense’.

If senses are descriptions, can they explain why one utterance is informative and the other not?
Jein: Ja--we can see that the descriptions are different; Nein--what does this have to do with informativeness?
To understand sense, we need to link it to knowledge of reference (as I explained last time) ...

The sense of an utterance of a word (or phrase)
is what you know when you
have knowledge of reference.

NB: sense isn’t knowledge of reference, but the think known.
How are these connected?

Contrast that utterance of ‘Charly is Charly’ with the utterance ‘Charly is Samantha’

ftbe: These may differ in informativeness.

Terminology: call whatever aspect of meaning explains the difference ‘sense’.

So if senses are descriptions and if sense are what you know when you have knowledge of reference, can we explain the difference in informativeness?
Yes, absolutely.

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

If we connect sense with knowledge of reference in this way, then we have to ask whether descriptions can fulfil these functions ...

ftbe:

Communicators can know, sometimes,
whether they are understanding.
How?

Utterers make rational, voluntary use of some regularites
while merely conforming to others.
How is this possible?

∴ there is a mental state of the utterer in virtue of which her utterance refers to ‘Earth’.

Call this mental state ‘knowledge of reference’.

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

recall campbell’s picture ...

‘There is a common-sense picture of the relation between knowledge of reference and pattern of use.

... you use the word the way you do because you know what it stands for’

Campbell, 2002 p. 4

The definition: “‘Elmo’ refers to the oldest tree in this garden.” What does this statement do? “By defining what has to be the case for a proposition involving the name ‘Elmo’ to be true, this statement of reference defines the objective at which the introduction rule aims, and allows you to determine what we should take to be the implications of a statement using the name. In that sense, it justifies the use of those introduction and elimination rules above.” (25) Cf. #83 (p. 226) and especially #84 (p. 226)

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

Are senses descriptions?

No because of the elephant (perceptual demonstratives ...)

Example (use 1): “A bear is about to attack me”

contrast: ‘A bear is about to attach Steve’

The sense of ‘I’ cannot be the sense of ‘Steve’.

Example (use 2): “A bear is about to attack me”

“When you and I entertain the sense of "A bear is about to attack me," we behave similarly. We both roll up in a ball and try to be as still as possible …

“When you and I both apprehend the thought that I am about to be attacked by a bear, we behave differently. I roll up in a ball, you run to get help.”

Perry, 1977 p. 494

Could the sense ‘I’ be a description?

Are senses descriptions?

I think senses are not descriptions and that we need to go back to what Rusell said about acquaintance ...