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Russell’s Argument on Acquaintance

Recall the Principle ...
\emph{The Principle of Acquaintance}:

‘Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted’

\citep[p.~209]{Russell:1910fa}

Russell, 1910 [1963] p. 209

Structure of larger argument -- Russell’s own argument is interesting but doesn’t go deep enough; we need to think more carefully about why knowledge of reference is needed.

What is Russell’s argument?

‘Whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging //p. 211// must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted. This is merely to say that

we cannot make a judgement or a supposition without knowing what it is that we are making our judgement or supposition about.

It seems to me that the truth of this principle is evident as soon as the principle is understood’

\citep[pp.~210--11]{Russell:1910fa}.

Russell, 2010 pp. 210-11

Never talk about yourself. It’s always irrelevant.
But a real argument does follow ...

‘I think the theory that judgements consist of ideas ... is fundamentally mistaken.

The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be called the ‘idea’ of something outside the mind of the person who has the idea, and that, since judgement is a mental event, its constituents must be constituents of the mind of the person judging.

But in this view ideas become a veil between us and outside things—we never really, in knowledge, attain //p. 212// to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things.

The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, is utterly obscure ...

I ... see no reason to believe that, when we are acquainted with an object, there is in us something which can be called the ‘idea’ of the object.

On the contrary, I hold that acquaintance is wholly a relation, not demanding any such constituent of the mind as is supposed by advocates of ‘ideas’.’

Russell, 1910 [1963] pp. 211–2

‘I think the theory that judgements consist of ideas ... is fundamentally mistaken. The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be called the ‘idea’ of something outside the mind of the person who has the idea, and that, since judgement is a mental event, its constituents must be constituents of the mind of the person judging. But in this view ideas become a veil between us and outside things—--we never really, in knowledge, attain //p. 212// to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things. The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, is utterly obscure ... I ... see no reason to believe that, when we are acquainted with an object, there is in us something which can be called the ‘idea’ of the object. On the contrary, I hold that acquaintance is wholly a relation, not demanding any such constituent of the mind as is supposed by advocates of ‘ideas’’ \citep[pp.~211--12]{Russell:1910fa}.

Reconstruction of Russell’s argument

Judgements are about objects in the world. [intentionality]

Any theory of judgement needs to elucidate the relation between a judgement and an object.

Invoking ideas to do this makes intentionality more, not less, obscure.

Therefore:

The intentionality of judgement consists at bottom in a relation between a thinker and an object.

Terminology: call this relation ‘acquaintance’.

It’s not much of an argument, but it’s interesting.
We’re very far from our concern with words! There’s something truly fascinating here, that’s relevant to the course, but I’m not sure I can make the connection to our basic question about reference.

How to get from
the relation between a judgement and an object
to
the relation between a word and an object?

If we were to shift from theory about the relation between a judgement and an object to a relation between a word and an object, what theory of communication by language would we need?

The utterance of a sentence expresses a judgement.

The audience’s task is to infer the judgement from the words.

They can do this because the words uttered correspond to parts of the judgement.

What is wrong with this picture?

Reconstruction of Russell’s argument

Judgements are about objects in the world. [intentionality]

Any theory of judgement needs to elucidate the relation between a judgement and an object.

Invoking ideas to do this makes intentionality more, not less, obscure.

Therefore:

The intentionality of judgement consists at bottom in a relation between a thinker and an object.

Terminology: call this relation ‘acquaintance’.

Possible project: Evaluate Russell’s case for the Principle of Acquintance.

Summary

Russell’s idea:

Reference requires acquaintance.

Russell’s argument:

Objects are constituents of judgements because ideas obscure the relation between judgements and objects ...