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Knowledge of Reference and Pragmatics

Recall this distinction \citep{Neale:1990hg,ludlow:1991_indefinite}: \begin{enumerate} \item MS, the meaning of the sentence; \item PE, the proposition expressed; \item PM, the proposition meant; \item SG, the speaker’s grounds for making an utterance. \end{enumerate}

Reference

Steve’s 13:11 utterance of ‘Earth’ refers to Earth

Knowledge of Reference : what is meant?

1. Steve knows Earth (either by acquiantance or description).

Objection: you might be acquainted with the referent while unaware of any connection between it and the utterance. (Imagine using a foreign word just by chance ...)
Too intellecutalist ---

2. Steve knows that his 13:11 utterance of ‘Earth’ refers to Earth.

3. There is a state of Steve’s mind in virtue of which his 13:11 utterance of ‘Earth’ refers to Earth.

Q1 What, if anything, is that state of mind?

Q2 Why think there any such thing as this state of mind?

E.g. on some versions of the causal theory, states of mind are not directly relevant for utterances of words to refer.

At bottom, communication with words is a matter of following rules.

This can be done without any insight into why the rules are as they are.

Therefore mental states of communicators in virtue of which their utterances refer are unnecessary for characterising reference.

cf Putnam 1978

Refuted by Groucho.

‘I’ve had a great evening. This wasn’t it.’

Recall this distinction ...

MS, the meaning of the sentence;

PE, the proposition expressed; and

PM, the proposition meant.

Neale, 1990 p. 75

MS is a function from
The meaning of a sentence is a function from contexts of utterance to propositions. (This should really be complicated : need to go from context of utterance THROUGH context of evaluation TO a truth condition.)
I don’t think there’s any mystery about why we need a PM (actually, often more than one). This is just a matter of saying that when you utter a sentence and communication succeeds, there is something, or some things, which the audience understands.
Why suppose that there is a proposition expressed (PE)? Because Compositionality means MS has to be determined by the meanings of words plus syntactic structure, whereas reflection on Groucho’s comment shows that PM can vary wildly depending on arbitrary features of the context of utterance.
Q1 Why distinguish PE and PM? \begin{enumerate} \item (Assumption) MS is a function from contexts of utterances to propositions. \item Suppose for a contradiction that PMs were the values of this function, i.e. MS + context of utterance yields PM. \item Then Compositionality would reqiure a systematic relation between the words uttered and PM. \item (Observation) Substituting words in an utterance can cause PM to vary dramatically, as can what happens after the utterance is over (‘I’ve had a great evening. This wasn’t it’). \item Therefore: what MS + context of utterance yields is not (always) a PM. \end{enumerate} Terminology: Let PE be what MS + context of utterance yields. (Strictly speaking we need context of evaulation too, and further complexities; see \citet{speaks:2018_theories}.) The above argument shows that PE is distinct from PM.
Recall from earler ...

I have had breakfast.

I have had a kidney removed.

I have had fermented fish for breakfast.

I have had a great evening.

Why is this relevant?

Among utterances of these sentences,
there can be is variation in the PM
although Compositionality does not permit corresponding variation in MS.

On the one hand, there can be significant variation in what utterances of these sentences are communicating. That is, the PM varies.
Compositionality does not permit corresponding variation in MS because (a) the structures are similar and (b) the variations cannot be pinned on variations in the meanings of expressions which differ between these sentences. This is most clearly shown by the last two examples, which illustrate that utterances of the same sentence can involve large variations in PM.

Given that MS is a function from contexts of utterance to propositions,
the values of this function will not typically be a PM.

Terminology: Call the value of MS in a given context of utterance the ‘proposition expressed (PE)’.

Recall this distinction ...

MS, the meaning of the sentence;

PE, the proposition expressed; and

PM, the proposition meant.

Neale, 1990 p. 75

An utter’s \emph{knowledge of reference} concerning her utterance of ‘Earth’ is that state of her mind in virtue of which this utterance refers to Earth.
Q2: Why suppose that there is any such thing as knowledge of reference?
Successful communication with words involves specifying a PM to be communicated and selecting words which will communicate this PM to your audience. In successfully selecting the words, you manifest sensitivity to the relations between MS, PE and PM. But the relation between PE and PM is defined in terms of cooperation (Grice) or relevance (Sperber & Wilson); it involves uncodifiable dependence on arbitrary features of the context of utterance. And the only available models of how to get from PM to words involves reasoning about PE, MS and either cooperation or relevance. Therefore, you (or something in you) probably has to represent both MS and PE in order to select words which will communicate the specified PM to your audience

How do you get from PE to PM?

reasoning about cooperation (Grice)

searching for relevance (Sperber & Wilson)

At bottom, communication with words is a matter of following rules.

This can be done without any insight into why the rules are as they are.

Therefore mental states of communicators in virtue of which their utterances refer are unnecessary for characterising reference.

cf Putnam 1978

Two Arguments

1. Communication with words involves successful communication of a PM.

2. Which PMs an utterance communicates depends on context in arbitrarily complex, uncodifiable ways.

Therefore,
3. communication with words cannot be entirely a mechanical, script-following, rule-bound activity.

1. Arriving at a PM depends on taking the PE and searching for cooperation or relevance.

Therefore,
2. communication requires representing PEs, which requires knowledge of reference.

Reference

Steve’s 13:11 utterance of ‘Earth’ refers to Earth

Knowledge of Reference : what is meant?

1. Steve knows Earth (either by acquiantance or description).

3. There is a state of Steve’s mind in virtue of which his 13:11 utterance of ‘Earth’ refers to Earth.

Q1 What, if anything, is that state of mind?

Q2 Why think there any such thing as this state of mind?

E.g. on some versions of the causal theory, states of mind are not directly relevant for utterances of words to refer.
Recall this question from an earlier lecture

When the utterance of a word refers to a thing,
must the utterer have knowledge of reference?

The main question for this course is:

What is the relation between
an utterance of a word (or phrase)
and a thing
when the utterance refers to the thing?

It is a psychological relation.

The main conclusion I draw: