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Pragmatic Aspects

Consider a fairly standard picture of how communication with words might work:
\emph{A Simple Picture:} \begin{enumerate} \item 1. There is a sentence \item 2. which you utter in a context, and \item 3. the sentence plus the context fixes what the words refer to in accordance with codifiable rules. \end{enumerate} Example, when you utter ‘I have had breakfast’, your utterance of ‘I’ refers to you because you are the utterer.

A Simple Picture

1. There is a sentence, e.g. ‘I have had breakfast’,

2. which you utter in a context, and

3. the sentence plus the context fixes what the words refer to in accordance with codifiable rules.
E.g. ‘I’ refers to the utterer.

But things are not are quite this simple. Take an utterance of ‘I have had breakfast’. Suppose you say this in response to my question, ‘Are you hungry’. As \citet{Carston:2002tl} notes, I would normally understand that you’ve had breakfast \emph{today}.

‘I have had the oil changed’

Now contrast other sentences which have the same form. An utterance of ‘I have had the oil changed’ would not normally convey anything about today.

‘I have had a kidney removed’

And some utterances of the same form convey once-in-a-lifetime events.

‘I have had fermented fish for breakfast’

Finally, some utterance might convey quite different things depending on where in the world you are. As a Norwegian in Norway, you might reasonably be interpreted as talking about today; as a North American recounting a visit, what you communicate would probably not be about today.

[on leaving a party] ‘I have had great evening. This wasn’t it.’ (Groucho Marx)

Finally, as Grice notes, what your audience understands can be modified by things you go on to say. For example ...
What can we conclude?

If we accept the Simple Picture,

then what utterances communicate goes beyond

what any words and phrases refer to.

This is far from an isolated example ...

Jack and Jill went up the hill [together].

Beatrice has always been a great lecturer [since she’s been a lecturer, not since she was born].

Sigrid took out her key and opened the door [with her key].

Harold went to the edge of the pool and jumped [into the pool].

Carston, 2002 p. 22

What you have just been looking at are all examples of what is called ‘free enrichment’
“In many instances, it seems that the pragmatic contribution to the proposition expressed by an utterance goes well beyond ensuring minimal propositionality.”
\citep[p.~22]{Carston:2002tl}

Carston, 2002 p. 22

This is a pervasive feature of communication by language.

What can we conclude? As I said before,

If we accept the Simple Picture,

then what utterances communicate goes beyond

what any words and phrases refer to.

\citet[p.~75]{Neale:1990hg} proposes a three-fold distinction (to which \citet{ludlow:1991_indefinite} add SG): \begin{enumerate} \item MS, the meaning of the sentence; \item PE, the proposition expressed; \item PM, the proposition meant; \item SG, the speaker’s grounds for making an utterance. \end{enumerate}

MS, the meaning of the sentence;

PE, the proposition expressed; and

PM, the proposition meant.

Neale, 1990 p. 75

The meaning of the sentence is supposed to be something the sentence has irrespective of any particular context of utterance. This is not something that enables us to evaluate whether the sentence is true or false since the meaning of the sentence does not determine who the sentence is about. Accordingly no proposition is involved at all.

‘I have had breakfast’

To illustrate, consider the sentence ‘I have had breakfast’ again. Is this sentence true or false? Without any context of utterance, there is no saying who it is about. So the sentence cannot be either true or false. So MS cannot be a proposition, nor anything capable of being true or false.
We get to PE, the proposition expressed, by adding in the context of utterance. In this case, the proposition expressed is ‘I [Ayesha] have had breakfast.’ And this proposition is true just if Ayesha’s life has not been entirely breakfastless.
When people talk about ‘literal meaning’, they sometimes have in mind the PE.
The Proposition Meant, PM, is what Ayesha intends to convey in uttering this sentence.
Typically for every PE there will be many PM. Depending on the context these may include: I [Ayesha] have had breakfast today [Tuesday]. I [Ayesha] am not hungry. I [Ayesha] do not wish to have breakfast with you [Steve/John] now [Thursday 13.55pm].
Is the distinction clear to you? Do you have any questions about it? Do you think the distinction is correct?
[After discussion] Note that this is merely a schematic proposal. We are leaving open some important questions. For example, How can we rigorously distinguish PM from PE? And, How is PM determined?
If we wanted to rely heavily on this three-fold distinction, we would need to answer these questions, and more.
Come to think of it, why should we accept that sentences have anything like meanings at all? I’ve been stressing that we should anchor our discussion of technical terms like ‘reference’ and ‘meaning’ in facts to be explained.
Take a moment to recall the original justification for introducing the idea that utterances of words and phrases can refer to things.

fact to be explained

Ayesha utters ‘Earth is being warmed by human activity.’

Beatrice utters ‘Mars is being warmed by human activity.’

ftbe: Those utterances differ in that one is made true by how things are with Earth whereas the other is made true by how things are with Mars.

attempted explanation

‘Earth’ refers to Earth whereas ‘Mars’ refers to Mars.

What (if anything) is reference?

If this justifies anything, it justifies thinking that some utterances of words and phrases refer.

What could justify holding that
words, phrases or sentences
have meanings?

[I’m not going to discuss this question further in this lecture: the point of the discussion is just to get them thinking about the question which we’ll come back to in the next lecture.]

MS, the meaning of the sentence;

PE, the proposition expressed; and

PM, the proposition meant.

Neale, 1990 p. 75

So what is my point? I’m going to take a leap. Even without any proper understanding of why we should think of sentences as having meanings or of there being a distinction between PE and PM, I’m going to assume, just for now, that Neale’s three-fold distinction is correct. And we’re going to continue as if we all understood what these \emph{meanings} and \emph{propositions expressed} are (although I’m a little doubtful of this).
In terms of this distinction, Carston’s observations about free enrichment show that there is a significant gap between PE and PM. Consider one last contrast as an example ...

‘There is milk in the fridge.’

As \citet[p.~24]{Carston:2003os} notes, the PE is a very weak general proposition: that there is some presence of milk in the fridge (perhaps just a stale drip or two on a shelf). By contrast, the PM is much more specific: for instance, that there is milk usable for coffee in the fridge. Arguably, it is only the PM that is communicated; the PE is something competent communicators might hardly be aware of. ... and, arguably, it is only these latter that are meant”

‘There is mould in the fridge.’

Contrast the milk utterance with an utterance of ‘There is mould in the fridge’. You can see that the utterance of a sentence of the same form might involve a different PM: what I’m communicating this time is (hopefully) just about the merest traces of mould. (But actually maybe not. I suppose it depends on your standards.)

‘There are nuts in the fridge.’

Finally, an utterance of the same sentence might be linked to different PM in different contexts. For instance, if I was hungry, your utterance of ‘There are nuts in the fridge’ would suggest more than a trace elements; but if we were in a food factory where concern about allergies is an issue, an utterance of the same sentence might convey only that there are at least traces of nut in the fridge.
Recall the fairly standard picture of how communication with words might work.
The discussion so far does not show that the Simple Picture is incorrect, but it does show that it is importantly incomplete.
Why? Because the Simple Picture only captures PE, not PM. And if we want to understand communication with words, then of course it is PM that ultimately matters. So we can’t rely on a picture in which PM does not appear at all.
Now let’s go back to Donnellan’s objection to Russell on descriptions and consider how these ideas might apply ...

A Simple Picture

1. There is a sentence, e.g. ‘There is milk in the fridge’,

2. which you utter in a context, and

3. the sentence plus the context fixes what the words refer to in accordance with codifiable rules.