The Normativity of Meaning

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‘meaning is normative’

‘Whatever its pedigree, and however popular and suggestive it might seem, a slogan it remains.’

\citep[p.~221]{whiting:2016_what}

Whiting, 2016 p. 221

How to get past sloganeering?

First attempt

For any S, x: if ‘red’ means red, it is correct for S to apply ‘red’ to x if and only if x is red.

‘All parties, even the staunchest critics of Normativism, would agree that [this] is platitudinous’

Whiting, 2016 p. 222

I’ not sure I agree! Look: correctness conditions.

Second attempt:

For any S, x: if ‘red’ means red, S ought pro tanto not to (apply ‘red’ to x) if and only if x is not red.

Of course there can be overriding concerns, e.g. ethical concerns.

[This is Whiting’s view, which he claims to defend. What do you think?]

Third attempt:

For any S, x: if S intends by uttering ‘red’ to mean red, S ought not to (apply ‘red’ to x) if and only if x is not red.

‘instrumental normativity ... is not what the Normativist is after.’

Whiting, 2016 p. 222

I’m not sure why not, and I’m not sure how Whiting knows.

This is what I think is wrong with it.

“The intention to be taken to mean what one wants to be taken to mean is, it seems to me, so clearly the only aim that is common to all verbal behaviour that it is hard for me to see how anyone can deny it.”

This aim “assumes the notion of meaning”, but

“it provides a purpose which any speaker must have in speaking, and thus constitutes a norm against which speakers and others can measure the success of their verbal behavior.”

\citep[p.~11]{Davidson:1994ol}

Davidson 1994, p. 11

[my bit] Why suppose that any norms governing the use of words are essential features of every form of linguistic communication? One reason is this: where communication is difficult or fails altogether, there is a distinction between cases where the problem is due to the utterer’s choice of words and cases where the problem is due to the audience’s failure to understand. There is a distinction, that is, between the utterer who fails to make the meanings of her words clear to her audience (but is perhaps nevertheless understood because her audience can work out what she wants to get across) and the audience who fail to discern what an utterer’s words mean even though that meaning is plain enough. If someone were to tell us out of the blue that she is “taking my boor beetles to the battle bonk”, for example, the likely failure of understanding would probably be her fault, not ours. The existence of this distinction between two types of failure shows that there are correct and incorrect ways of using and understanding words, i.e. norms.

Third attempt:

For any S, x: if S intends by uttering ‘red’ to mean red, S ought not to (apply ‘red’ to x) if and only if x is not red.

‘instrumental normativity ... is not what the Normativist is after.’

Whiting, 2016 p. 222

How to respond to this in the light of Davidson?

instrumental normativity?

Analogy:

Intention 2: To save the zoo visitor from attack

Intention 1: by hitting the escaped gorilla with a tranquiliser dart.

Communication

Intention 1: To communicate that I don’t want coffee

Intention 2: by being understood as saying that my life is not entirely breakfastless.

Hard to believe this could be an intention. Psychology of meaning is barely studies.

‘meaning is normative’

‘Whatever its pedigree, and however popular and suggestive it might seem, a slogan it remains.’

\citep[p.~221]{whiting:2016_what}

Whiting, 2016 p. 221

In what sense, if any, is meaning normative?

So the challenge, which I’ll leave open, is how to make sense of the slogan.

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The Normativity of Meaning

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