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The Meaning of a Sentence, the Proposition Expressed and the Proposition Meant

Recall this distinction which we provisionally accepted and used in considering Donnellan ...

MS, the meaning of the sentence;

PE, the proposition expressed; and

PM, the proposition meant.

Neale, 1990 p. 75

Why accept that sentences have meanings? And what are meanings anyway?

What are the meanings of sentences?

Why suppose that sentences have meanings?

Two questions about MS: \begin{enumerate} \item What are the meanings of sentences? \item Why suppose that sentences have meanings? \end{enumerate}
Two facts to be explained: \begin{enumerate} \item If someone utters a sentence and you understand her, then you will likely understand others when they utter that sentence. And conversely. \item If a sentence is used to communicate something in one situation, then it can typically be used to communicate much the same thing in another situation. \end{enumerate} An attempted explanation: There are some things and nearly every sentence is related to a different thing. Communicators often know which thing is related to which sentence. This knowledge (is part of what) enables them to understand utterances of those sentences. Terminology: Call these things the ‘meanings’ of the sentences.

facts to be explained

If someone utters a sentence and you understand her, then you will likely understand others when they utter that sentence. And conversely.

If a sentence is used to communicate something in one situation, then it can typically be used to communicate much the same thing in another situation.

attempted explanation

There are some things and nearly every sentence is related to a different thing.

Communicators often know which thing is related to which sentence.

This knowledge (is part of what) enables them to understand utterances of those sentences.

termiology

Call these things ‘meanings’.

What (if anything) are these meaning things?

And what is this relation between the meanings and the sentences?

Consider the first question ... The answer to the first may be mappings from contexts of utterance to truth conditions.
One idea:

The meaning of a sentence is a function from contexts of utterance to propositions.

This should really be complicated : need to go from context of utterance THROUGH context of evaluation TO a truth condition.

Ex: Take ‘I have had breakfast’ and a context of utterance in which Ayesha utters it. The meaning of this sentence takes this context of utterance to the proposition that Ayesha had breakfast.

I won’t attempt to answer this question \citep[see][for an overview of candidate answers to these questions]{speaks:2018_theories}.

‘entities such as meanings ...
are not of independent interest’

\citep[p.~154]{Davidson:1974gh}

Davidson, 1974 p. 154

So now we have a provisional reason to accept that sentences have meanings.

MS, the meaning of the sentence;

PE, the proposition expressed; and

PM, the proposition meant.

Neale, 1990 p. 75

I don’t think there’s any mystery about why we need a PM (actually, often more than one). This is just a matter of saying that when you utter a sentence and communication succeeds, there is something, or some things, which the audience understands.
Why suppose that there is a proposition expressed?
Two facts to be explained: \begin{enumerate} \item \emph{Systematicity} ‘there are definite and predictable patterns among the sentences [utterances of which] we understand’ \citep{Szabo:2004cu} \item \emph{Productivity} communicators can understand utterances of an indefinitely large range of sentences we have never heard before. \end{enumerate} An attempted explanation: Words have meanings, and: \begin{quote} [\emph{Compositionality}] The meaning of a sentence (and of any complex expression) is fully determined by its structure and the meanings of its constituent words. \end{quote}

facts to be explained

Let’s take a look at two further facts to be explained ...

[Systematicity] ‘there are definite and predictable patterns among the sentences [utterances of which] we understand’(Szabó, 2004).

[Productivity] communicators can understand utterances of an indefinitely large range of sentences we have never heard before.

attempted explanation

Words have meanings (which are their senses).

[Compositionality] The meaning of a sentence (and of any complex expression) is fully determined by its structure and the meanings of its constituent words.

Why distinguish PE and PM? \begin{enumerate} \item (Assumption) MS is a function from contexts of utterances to propositions. \item Suppose for a contradiction that PMs were the values of this function, i.e. MS + context of utterance yields PM. \item Then Compositionality would reqiure a systematic relation between the words uttered and PM. \item (Observation) Substituting words in an utterance can cause PM to vary dramatically, as can what happens after the utterance is over (‘I’ve had a great evening. This wasn’t it’). \item Therefore: what MS + context of utterance yields is not (always) a PM. \item Terminology: Let PE be what MS + context of utterance yields. (Strictly speaking we need context of evaulation too, and further complexities; see \citet{speaks:2018_theories}.) \end{enumerate}
Recall from earler ...

I have had breakfast.

I have had a kidney removed.

I have had fermented fish for breakfast.

I have had a great evening.

Why is this relevant?

Among utterances of these sentences,
there can be is variation in the PM
although Compositionality does not permit corresponding variation in MS.

On the one hand, there can be significant variation in what utterances of these sentences are communicating. That is, the PM varies.
Compositionality does not permit corresponding variation in MS because (a) the structures are similar and (b) the variations cannot be pinned on variations in the meanings of expressions which differ between these sentences. This is most clearly shown by the last two examples, which illustrate that utterances of the same sentence can involve large variations in PM.

Given that MS is a function from contexts of utterance to propositions,
the values of this function will not typically be a PM.

Terminology: Call the value of MS in a given context of utterance the ‘proposition expressed (PE)’.

MS + context of utterance ---yields---> PE

So now we have a provisional reason to accept that there are propositions expresses (PEs) where PEs are distinct from PMs.

MS, the meaning of the sentence;

PE, the proposition expressed; and

PM, the proposition meant.

Neale, 1990 p. 75

What is the relation between PE and PM?

This will be the topic of the next lecture on relevance theory, with special guest lecturer John Michael ...
Let me put the issue another way ...

MS + context of utterance ---yields---> PE

PE + ??? ---yields---> PM