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Referential vs Attributive uses

Recall Russell’s Theory of Descriptions ...

The question Russell’s theory was supposed to answer was,

Which words (and phrases) refer?

To understand this question, it is helpful to distinguish communicating about something from referring to it. You can communicate about something without referring to it.

Distinction: communicating about vs referring

For example, suppose Ayesha is eating lunch really loudly. Then you can communicate about Ayesha in two ways. You might just utter ‘Ayesha is eating lunch’, or you might be more coy and say ‘*someone* [emphasis] is eating lunch’ while raising your eyebrows.
In this second case you are communicating about Ayesha without referring to her. Strictly speaking, your utterance would be true even if it were not Ayesha but someone else who was eating lunch.
[They eat lunch in this lecture so you can use the example to tease a noisy eater.]

‘Ayesha is eating lunch’

‘Someone is eating lunch’

So your utterance of ‘Ayesha’ refers to Ayesha ...
... whereas your utterance of ‘someone’ does not refer at all.
Russell’s theory is about the contrast between another pair of examples ... Given that Ayesha is the smelliest cat in my house, you might think that there’s really no interesting distinction between these two utterances.

‘Ayesha is fluffy’

‘The smelliest cat in my house is fluffy’

But whereas most would think of the utterance of ‘Ayesha’ as referring to Ayesha,
Russell thought that an utterance of ‘the smelliest cat in my house’ does not refer, in just the way that an utterance of ‘someone’ does not refer.
Let’s take a look at Russell’s theory

‘we may put, in place of “the smelliest cat in my house,” the following: “One and only one entity is the smelliest cat in my house, and that cat is fluffy”’

Russell, 1905 p. 488

There is a tiny complication here ...

As you might remember, Russell also thought that proper names like ‘Ayesha’ are really disguised descriptions.

Three applications

Analysis of definite descriptions

Analysis of proper names (they are usually really disguised descriptions)

Distinguishing knowledge by description from knowledge by acquaintance

Here we are ignoring that part of his view, which I want us to treat as a separate debate. For now we are focussing on Russell’s attempt to characterise phrases like ‘the smelliest cat in my house’.
When we discussed Russell’s theory of descriptions, we saw that there were some good objections to it. However, we also saw that Ludlow has isolated a core idea which seems to withstand the objections.

‘The critical question is whether the sentences in which [phrases of the form ‘the so-and-so’] appear are quantificational or referential, and Russell may well be right about the critical cases here.

That is, many apparently referential constructions may in fact be quantificational.’

Ludlow, 2004

The core insight (‘many apparently referential constructions may in fact be quantificational’) is exactly what we are about to challenge in Donnellan ...

Donnellan’s objection

Today I want to look at another objection to Russell’s theory, one due to Donnellan. It is not a good objection, but it continues to be very influential. And, as you’ll see if you are very patient, reflecting on the objection can take us somewhere interesting even if, as I think, the objection fails.

“Suppose one is at a party and, seeing an interesting-looking person holding a Martini glass, one asks, “Who is the man drinking a Martini?” If it should turn out that there is only water in the glass, one has nevertheless asked a question about a particular person, a question that it is possible for someone to answer”

\citep[p.~287]{Donnellan:1966th}.

(Donnellan 1966: 287).

Ask them, What do you think Donnellan’s objection might be? Can you anticipate an objection based on this assertion? Turn to the person next to you. You have 90 seconds to discuss this.
[After the discussion in pairs, ask them to make suggestions in a whole-class discussion.]

The argument from misdescription (Donnellan’s?)

If ‘the man drinking a Martini’ were quantificational, then the question would not be about anyone at all.

In that case it would be puzzling how the question can be answered.

But the question is easy to answer.

So the ‘the man drinking a Martini’ can’t be quantificational.

It must be referential.

The argument from misdescription (Donnellan’s?) \begin{enumerate} \item If ‘the man drinking a Martini’ were quantificational, then the question would not be about anyone at all. \item In that case it would be puzzling how the question can be answered. \item But the question is easy to answer. \item So the ‘the man drinking a Martini’ can’t be quantificational. \item Therefore it must be referential. \end{enumerate}
The question Russell’s theory was supposed to answer was,

Which words (and phrases) refer?

Russell: Utterances of phrases of the form ‘the man drinking Martini’ are always quantificational.

Donnellan: Utterances of phrases of the form ‘the man drinking Martini’ are sometimes referential.

Note that Donnellan doesn’t think all utterances of phrases of the form ‘the man drinking Martini’ are referential. Instead he thinks ...
That there some are referential and some are quantificational.

Distinction: utterances of ‘the man drinking Martini’ can be ...

referential

[‘Who is the man drinking Martini?’]

attributive

[‘I have no idea who it is, but one man here is drinking Martini. Whoever he is, I want the man drinking Martini thrown out of this party.’]

“I will call the two uses of definite descriptions I have in mind the attributive use and the referential use.

A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so.

A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing”

\citep[p.~285]{Donnellan:1966th}.

Donnellan, 1966 p. 285

Note that Donnellan is talking about uses, not about words or phrases. Throughout this course I have been stressing a distinction between the idea that utterances of words refer and the idea that words themselves refer.
How does Donnellan’s talk about ‘uses’ fit with this distinction? I think what he might as well be talking about are utterances. In my terms, his idea is that some utterances of definite descriptions refer whereas others do not. The former are the ‘referential’ utterances, the latter are the ‘attributive’ utterances.
Consider a second example which might (has) been used to make Donellan’s distinction (see \citet{ludlow:1991_indefinite} for details) ...

‘The man drinking Martini is wearing a hat.’

‘No he isn’t, and he is not drinking Martini.’

What do the utterances of ‘he’ refer to? It seems they refer to the very man the utterance of the first sentence (‘The man drinking Martini is wearing a hat’) was about. And this could be taken to indicate that the utterance of ‘the man drinking Martini’ also refers to this man. At least I suppose Donnellan would think this. (This is far from obvious; \citet{ludlow:1991_indefinite} mention a range of possibilities).
The question Russell’s theory was supposed to answer was,

Which words (and phrases) refer?

Russell: Utterances of phrases of the form ‘the man drinking Martini’ are always quantificational.

Donnellan: Utterances of phrases of the form ‘the man drinking Martini’ are sometimes referential.

Who is right, Russell or Donnellan?

[after they’ve discussed in pairs, then in whole group] In order to further evaluate his argument, we need to consider how his observations might fit into a broader pattern of observations of how communication by language works ...