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Descriptions

What is the objection?

Recall ...

We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise;
and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth, the utterer must be acquainted with Earth. (And ...)

 

Russell’s objection to Russell

‘Thus when, for example, we make a statement about Julius Caesar, it is plain that Julius Caesar himself is not before our minds, since we are not acquainted with him.’

\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

Let’s try to formulate the objection more carefully

We can successfully communicate about Julius Caesar, as when you utter ‘Julius drank the Rubicon’.

This is because your utterance of ‘Julius Caesar’ refers to Julius Caesar.

You are not acquainted with Julius Caesar.

Therefore:

An utterance can refer to something with which the utter is not acquainted.

I think the argument is clearly valid. Which premise could be rejected?
We don’t know enough about acquaintance yet to properly evaluate this.

a pair of distinctions:

(a) singular term vs quantifier phrase

(b) communicating about vs referring

James is worried’ -- singular term

Someone is worried’ -- quantifier phrase

A [to B]: ‘Don’t open that door!’

B [to C, loudly]: ‘Someone is worred’

quantifier phrase used to talk about someone particular

You can successfully communicate a message about something without referring to it.

We can successfully communicate about Julius Caesar, as when you utter ‘Julius drank the Rubicon’.

This is because your utterance of ‘Julius Caesar’ refers to Julius Caesar.

You are not acquainted with Julius Caesar.

Therefore:

An utterance can refer to something with which the utter is not acquainted.

Russell denies this premise ...

‘Thus when, for example, we make a statement about Julius Caesar, it is plain that Julius Caesar himself is not before our minds, since we are not acquainted with him.

We have in mind some description of Julius Caesar: 'the man who was assassinated on the Ides of March', 'the founder of the Roman Empire', ...

Thus our statement does not mean quite what it seems to mean, but means something involving, instead of Julius Caesar, some description of him which is composed wholly of particulars and universals with which we are acquainted.’

\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

What is the relation between in mind and our statement?
And what is this notion of meaning?

Your utterance of

‘Julius Caesar drank the Rubicon’

is, from the point of view of truth and reference, just like

an utterance of

‘The man who was assassinated on the Ides of March drank the Rubicon.’

This is how Russell responds to the objection ...

We can successfully communicate about Julius Caesar, as when you utter ‘Julius drank the Rubicon’.

This is because your utterance of ‘Julius Caesar’ refers to Julius Caesar.

You are not acquainted with Julius Caesar.

Therefore:

An utterance can refer to something with which the utter is not acquainted.

I think the argument is clearly valid. Which premise could be rejected?
and if Russell is right, he can hold on to his claim about acquaintance and reference ...

What is the objection?

Recall ...

We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise;
and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted

Russell, 1912 chapter 5