Knowledge of Reference (Part 2)

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Knowledge of Reference (Part 2)

‘There is a common-sense picture of the relation between knowledge of reference and pattern of use.

... you use the word the way you do because you know what it stands for’

Campbell, 2002 p. 4

There is a common-sense picture of the relation between knowledge of reference and pattern of use. ... you use the word the way you do because you know what it stands for’ \citep[p.~4]{Campbell:2002ge}.

In other words, there is no argument. Worse, though, I think it is extremely difficult to grasp the picture Campbell has in mind: it’s an abstract, complex idea.

What is this knowledge of reference thing?

“On the common-sense picture, your knowledge of reference controls the pattern of use that you make of the term. You use the term the way you do because you know what it stands for. In the later Wittgenstein and in Quine, the problem is that they think the common-sense picture cannot be sustained. There is only the pattern of use: there is no such thing as a knowledge of reference which controls the pattern of use, and to which the pattern of use is responsible. In later Wittgenstein, the form the resulting problem takes is that the pattern of use now seems arbitrary, since it is no longer thought of as controlled by knowledge of reference. This is the issue he confronts in his discussion of rule-following. In Quine, the form the problem takes is that when we have only the pattern of use to consider, we find that it seems to leave under-determined the ascription of meaning to the terms of a language. This is Quine’s problem of the indeterminacy of translation. In the ensuing discussion, amazingly, the common-sense picture—that you use the word the way you do because you know what it stands for—is all but lost sight of”

\citep[p.~4]{Campbell:2002ge}

Reference

Steve’s 13:11 utterance of ‘Earth’ refers to Earth

Knowledge of Reference : what is meant?

1. Steve knows Earth (either by acquiantance or description).

Objection: you might be acquainted with the referent while unaware of any connection between it and the utterance. (Imagine using a foreign word just by chance ...)

2. Steve knows that his 13:11 utterance of ‘Earth’ refers to Earth.

Too intellecutalist ---

3. There is a state of Steve’s mind in virtue of which his 13:11 utterance of ‘Earth’ refers to Earth.

Q1 What, if anything, is that state of mind?

Q2 Why think there any such thing as this state of mind?

E.g. on some versions of the causal theory, states of mind are not directly relevant for utterances of words to refer.

So I want to understand this picture, and I want to know whether it is correct ...

‘There is a common-sense picture of the relation between knowledge of reference and pattern of use.

... you use the word the way you do because you know what it stands for’

Campbell, 2002 p. 4

This, then, is my question

When the utterance of a word refers to a thing,
must the utterer have knowledge of reference?

To repeat: what this ‘knowledge of reference’ this is is left open: it is simply a term for that state of the utterer’s mind, if any, in virtue of which her utterance of a word or phrase refers to a thing.

Characterising communication by language should be done
from the communicators’ persectives.

I don't think it's an argument Of course, you could just take it as defining your aims. But maybe we should consider arguments.

Here is Dummett saying roughly the same

‘to attribute to a speaker no more than knowledge of how to play … interlocking language games is to make him a participant in an activity he cannot survey (‘cannot see what is going on’)’

\citep[p.\ 224]{Dummett:1979fb}

Dummett, 1979 p. 224

I still don't think it's an argument. In a moment we’ll consider a counter view (Putnam’s alternative) ...

This is the question again: current answer we are considering is: Yes, because that way we can understand things from the perspective of the language user.

When the utterance of a word refers to a thing,
must the utterer have knowledge of reference?

Last time we considered the analogy with the light switch. Here’s essentially the same point put in another way.

Putnam’s answer is, in effect, that we can interpret the behaviour as conforming to rules insofar as doing so allows us, as outsiders, to explain its success. [There’s a strong pragmatist streak here.]

‘On the model just sketched, one can use one’s language [...] without any [...] notion of truth [or reference].

The instructions the mind follows, in this model, do not presuppose notions of the order of ‘true’;

they are instructions for [...] uttering, instructions for carrying out syntactic transformations, [...] etc.

But the success of the ‘language-using program’ may well depend on the existence of a suitable correspondence between the words of a language and things ....

The notions of truth and reference may be of great importance in explaining the relation of language to the world

without being as central [...] as they are in [...] theories that equate understanding with knowledge of truth conditions.

\citep[p.~100]{Putnam:1978zr}

Putnam, 1978 p. 100

Avoid adjectives. We have no measure of importance. The point we can make here is just that they may play some role in explaining how agents can achieve ends by communicating with words.

Avoid this kind of vague language in your own writing. We do not have a way of measuring centrality so there’s no debate we can have. What Putnam really wants to say is that there may be cases in which communication with words does not involve any knowledge of reference at all. Although he also allows that humans may have and use insights into reference in some cases.

When the utterance of a word refers to a thing,
must the utterer have knowledge of reference?

Yes

Those who communicate with words are not participants in an activity they cannot survey; they can ‘see what is going on‘.

Therefore in characterising reference, we should attempt to do so in terms of those of their mental states in virtue of which their utterances refer to things.

When the utterance of a word refers to a thing,
must the utterer have knowledge of reference?

Is there only the pattern of use,
or is there also justification for it?

Are there any arguments?

Dummett does offer at least two arguments ...

Dummett’s first argument ...

Why think there any such thing as knowledge of reference?

Understanding a word can’t be purely a practical ability because this would ‘render mysterious our capacity to know whether we are understanding.’

Dummett, 1991 p. 93

\citep[p.\ 93]{Dummett:1991yj}

Fact to be explained: Communicators can know, sometimes, whether they are understanding.

Method: identify facts to be explained (this goes along with The Difference)

Candidate explanation: Having knowledge of reference (whatever that is) can enable you to know, sometimes, that you are understanding. (And lacking knowledge of reference that you are not understanding.)

Dummett’s second argument ...

Communication by language is ‘a rational activity on the part of creatures to whom can be ascribed intention and purpose’.

We can, and should, distinguish ‘those regularities of which a language speaker [utterer], acting as a rational agent engaged in conscious, voluntary action, makes use from those that may be hidden from him.’

Dummett, 1978 p. 104

\citep[p.\ 104]{Dummett:1978zv}

Fact to be explained: Utterers make rational, voluntary use of certain regularites while merely conforming to others.

Method: identify facts to be explained (this goes along with The Difference)

Candidate explanation: Those regularities which arise because an utterer uses a word in accordance with her knowledge of reference are the ones she makes rational, voluntary use of.

When the utterance of a word refers to a thing,
must the utterer have knowledge of reference?

Summary of argument ...

Claim:
There is such a thing as knowledge of reference; this is what justifies (or not) an utterer’s use of a word.

Argument 1:

ftbe: Communicators can know, sometimes, whether they are understanding.

e: Having knowledge of reference (whatever that is) can enable you to know, sometimes, that you are understanding. (And lacking knowledge of reference that you are not understanding.)

Method : fact to be explained vs explanation of it.

When the utterance of a word refers to a thing,
must the utterer have knowledge of reference?

Is there only the pattern of use,
or is there also justification for it?

Summary --- all this was Discussion of Campbell’s simple claim that ...

‘There is a common-sense picture of the relation between knowledge of reference and pattern of use.

... you use the word the way you do because you know what it stands for’

Campbell, 2002 p. 4

My proposal:

1. There are multiple, internally consistent characterisations of reference.

2. If our aim were only to explain The Difference, there would be no ground for preferring one over all others.

3. But we must also explain The Justification (How does knowledge of reference cause and justify the use of a word?).

What’s that? Method: must be extremely clear about the thing to be explained.

If we except this, we must eliminate the simple version of Kripke’s theory ...

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Knowledge of Reference (Part 2)

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