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\title {Words and Things \\ Lecture 02}

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Lecture 02:

Words and Things

[email protected]

\def \ititle {Lecture 02}

\def \isubtitle {Words and Things}

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\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle

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Steve’s Oct 4th, 2018 1.11pm utterance
‘Earth is being warmed by human activity.’
is true because Earth is being warmed by human activity.

Steve’s Oct 4th, 2018 1.11pm utterance
‘Mars is being warmed by human activity.’
is false because Mars is not being warmed by human activity.

But this why question is too hard, so I substituted another

The first depends for it’s truth on how things are with Earth whereas the second depends for its truth on how things are with Mars. Why do the two utterances differ in this way?

An idea, in outline

1. ‘Earth’ refers to Earth

2. An utterance of ‘Mars’ refers to Mars

3. The two utterances differ in what would make them true because of (1) and (2).

What is this reference thing?

But what (if anything) is reference?

Something we postulate to explain the difference between these utterances. (Background: systematic contribution of words)

fact to be explained

Those utterances differ in that one is made true by how things are with Earth whereas the other is made true by how things are with Mars.

attempted explanation

‘Earth’ refers to Earth whereas ‘Mars’ refers to Mars.

But what (if anything) is reference?

Davidson : it might not explain anything at all, might be a merely formal thing.

scepticism about reference

‘it is not at all clear that the theory of natural language and its use involves relations of “denotation”, “true of”, etc., in anything like the sense of the technical theory of meaning … //p. 27// … general issues of intentionality, including those of language use, cannot reasonably be assumed to fall within naturalistic inquiry’

\citep[pp.~25--7]{Chomsky:1995yg}

Chomsky, 1995 pp. 25–7

‘There is simply no way of making sense of … any of the work in theory of meaning and philosophy of language that relies on such notions’ as reference.

\citep[p.~49]{Chomsky:1995yg}.

Chomsky, 1995 p. 49

Why do those utterances differ in that one is made true by how things are with Earth whereas the other by how things are with Mars?

Guess: There is some relation between the utterance of ‘Earth’ [the word] and Earth [the thing] in virtue of which Steve’s utterance of the sentence is about Earth rather than Mars.

Terminology: call it ‘reference’

Q: What is this relation?

Maybe we’ve met Chomsky’s challenge ... but I can’t help feeling that we’re missing something deep.

Possible Task:

Critically examine how one theory of reference has been developed.

Eg. be informed about the objections; read some of the literature. I’m going to take the descriptions idea; although I don’t think it will work, it will allow us to consider some of the issues.

Acquaintance (Russell’s Principle)

\section{Acquaintance (Russell’s Principle)}

What is acquaintance?

Start with it’s formal properties ...

‘Acquaintance ... essentially consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind’

\citep[chapter 4]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 Chapter 4

But which relation is acquaintance? ...

What else can we say about acquaintance?

‘we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths’

\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

What does this mean? Nothing, by itself. But Russell goes on to explain what he means:

Contrast: infer existence of a phone in your washing machine from the bumps vs opening it and finding the phone.

Modes of acquaintance (?):
perception?
memory?
self-awareness?
attention?

‘knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths’

\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

So there's a contrast between K of things and K of truths.

Why care about acquaintance?

Our concern is with a question about reference. So what are we doing discussing acquaintance? For Russell, and many following him, acquaintance is the core of reference.

\emph{The Principle of Acquaintance}:

‘Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted’

\citep[p.~209]{Russell:1910fa}

Russell, 1910 [1963] p. 209

‘it is scarcely conceivable that we can make a judgement or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about.
We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise;
and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted’

\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

What’s that?

Provisionally : the meaning of a word = its referent. This is nice because it is close to Russell and avoids introducing another unknown.

Puzzle: how can we be acquainted with a meaning? Isn’t acquaintance supposed to be a relation of direct awareness (e.g. as characteristically involved in perceiving something)?

Solution: meanings are things : the meaning of a word is its referent.

I want to go over this one more time as it’s important

Why do those utterances differ in that one is made true by how things are with Earth whereas the other by how things are with Mars?

Guess: There is some relation between the utterance of ‘Earth’ [the word] and Earth [the thing] in virtue of which Steve’s utterance of the sentence is about Earth rather than Mars.

Terminology: call it ‘reference’

Q: What is this relation?

Russell: For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth, the utterer must be acquainted with Earth. (And ...)

Russell’s claim about reference is incompatible with
(the sufficiency of) three crude theories of reference ...

Russell: For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth, the utterer must be acquainted with Earth. (And ...)

Causal (Kripke): For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth is for (a) Earth to have been baptised ‘Earth’ and (b) this utterance to be causally related in the appropriate way to that baptism event.

Russell: For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth, the utterer must be acquainted with Earth. (And ...)

Pragmatist: For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth is for this utterance to sieze the ‘interpreter’s eyes and forcibly turn them upon’ Earth.

Russell: For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth, the utterer must be acquainted with Earth. (And ...)

Description (nobody?): For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth is for (a) the speaker to have associated this utterance of ‘Earth’ with a descripton, and (b) Earth to be the thing which, uniquely, this description is true of.

Does reference require acquaintance with the referent?

Russell’s principle is clearly significant if true because it conflicts with alternative approaches (although we could revise them to incorporate it, albeit changing their nature dramatically). But is it true?

My proposal:

1. There are multiple, internally consistent characterisations of reference.

2. If our aim were only to explain The Difference, there would be no ground for preferring one over all others.

Methods: Note that a lot of effort goes in to specifying the thing to be explained (The Difference).

So let us consider whether we should broaden our aims ...

Descriptions

\section{Descriptions}

Recall ...

We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise;
and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted’

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

For an utterance of ‘Earth’ to refer to Earth, the utterer must be acquainted with Earth. (And ...)

Russell’s objection to Russell

‘Thus when, for example, we make a statement about Julius Caesar, it is plain that Julius Caesar himself is not before our minds, since we are not acquainted with him.’

\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

Let’s try to formulate the objection more carefully

We can successfully communicate about Julius Caesar, as when you utter ‘Julius drank the Rubicon’.

This is because your utterance of ‘Julius Caesar’ refers to Julius Caesar.

You are not acquainted with Julius Caesar.

Therefore:

An utterance can refer to something with which the utter is not acquainted.

I think the argument is clearly valid. Which premise could be rejected?

We don’t know enough about acquaintance yet to properly evaluate this.

a pair of distinctions:

(a) singular term vs quantifier phrase

(b) communicating about vs referring

‘James is worried’ -- singular term

‘Someone is worried’ -- quantifier phrase

A [to B]: ‘Don’t open that door!’

B [to C, loudly]: ‘Someone is worred’

quantifier phrase used to talk about someone particular

You can successfully communicate a message about something without referring to it.

We can successfully communicate about Julius Caesar, as when you utter ‘Julius drank the Rubicon’.

This is because your utterance of ‘Julius Caesar’ refers to Julius Caesar.

You are not acquainted with Julius Caesar.

Therefore:

An utterance can refer to something with which the utter is not acquainted.

Russell denies this premise ...

‘Thus when, for example, we make a statement about Julius Caesar, it is plain that Julius Caesar himself is not before our minds, since we are not acquainted with him.

We have in mind some description of Julius Caesar: 'the man who was assassinated on the Ides of March', 'the founder of the Roman Empire', ...

Thus our statement does not mean quite what it seems to mean, but means something involving, instead of Julius Caesar, some description of him which is composed wholly of particulars and universals with which we are acquainted.’

\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

What is the relation between in mind and our statement?

And what is this notion of meaning?

Your utterance of

‘Julius Caesar drank the Rubicon’

is, from the point of view of truth and reference, just like

an utterance of

‘The man who was assassinated on the Ides of March drank the Rubicon.’

This is how Russell responds to the objection ...

We can successfully communicate about Julius Caesar, as when you utter ‘Julius drank the Rubicon’.

This is because your utterance of ‘Julius Caesar’ refers to Julius Caesar.

You are not acquainted with Julius Caesar.

Therefore:

An utterance can refer to something with which the utter is not acquainted.

I think the argument is clearly valid. Which premise could be rejected?

and if Russell is right, he can hold on to his claim about acquaintance and reference ...

Recall ...

We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise;
and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted’

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

Rigid Designators

\section{Rigid Designators}

Let me introduce you to Alfred Eisenstaedt, the photojournalist who mixed up his cameras while photographing Marilyn Monroe. He’ll be interesting to us in a moment.

‘Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description.’

\citep[p.~206]{Russell:1910fa}

Russell, 1910 [1963] p. 206

Two things to note : (a) shift from what words are to thoughts in the mind of someone using them; (b) tension between saying that we need to replace proper names by descriptions and saying that they usually really are descriptions.

‘Alfred Eisenstaedt lived in Jackson Heights’.

‘The photojournalist who mixed up his cameras while photographing Marilyn Monroe lived in Jackson Heights.’

A rigid designator is an expression that refers to the same individual in every context of evaluation

\citep[p.~48]{Kripke:1980rw}

(see Kripke 1980: 48).

Counterfactual possibility: Eisenstaedt couldn’t make it so Martha Holmes (who lived in Manhattan) photographed Monroe.

Names are rigid designators.

Descriptions are not rigid designators.

Therefore:

It is false that ‘proper names are usually really descriptions’.

“If ‘Moses’ means ‘the man who did such and such’, then, if no one did such and such, Moses didn’t exist; … But … we can ask, if we speak of a counterfactual case where no one did indeed do such and such, say, lead the Israelites out of Egypt, does it follow that, in such a situation, Moses wouldn’t have existed? It would seem not. For surely Moses might have just decided to spend his days more pleasantly in the Egyptian courts. He might never have gone into politics or religion at all; and in that case maybe no one would have done any of the things that the Bible relates of Moses” \citep[p.~58]{Kripke:1980rw}

But: rigidification

‘The actual photojournalist who mixed up his cameras while photographing Marilyn Monroe lived in Jackson Heights.’

Possible project:

Are proper names usually really descriptions?

interim summary

Russell’s principle of acquaintance

We can successfully communicate using the names despite no acquaintance with the things named.

Distinguish (a) quantification vs singular term; (b) referring vs talking about

Russell: names are ‘usually really descriptions’ (ie. quantifiers, not singular terms)

Kripke: but names are rigid designators, unlike descriptions.

Complication: rigidification (‘the actual ...’)

Knowledge by Description

\section{Knowledge by Description}

‘we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths’

\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}

Russell, 1912 chapter 5

distinction 1:

knowledge by acquaintance vs knowledge by description

distinction 2:

singular term vs quantifier

Russell’s position (?)

1 When an utterance of a singular term refers to an object, the utter must be acquainted with that object.

Therefore:

2 ‘Julius Caesar’ is not a singular term.

What is the justification for this?

Alternative:

When an utterance of a word refers to an object, the utter must either be acquainted with that object or else know it by description.

Does reference require knowledge of the referent?

As I said earlier, I think our current anchor on reference doesn’t sufficiently constrain discussion ...

Consider three possibilities

If your utterance of a word refers to a thing, then ...

1. you must be acquainted with that thing;

2. you must either be acquainted with it or else know it by description; or

3. you need neither acquintace nor knowledge by description.

My proposal:

1. There are multiple, internally consistent characterisations of reference.

2. If our aim were only to explain The Difference, there would be no ground for preferring one over all others.

Methods: Note that a lot of effort goes in to specifying the thing to be explained (The Difference).

So let us consider whether we should broaden our aims ...

Keyboard Shortcuts?

Lecture 02:

Words and Things

[email protected]

Acquaintance (Russell’s Principle)

Descriptions

Rigid Designators

Knowledge by Description

Keyboard Shortcuts`?`