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Comparison: Maps

Here’s a cartographic representation of a journey. What makes it the case that this map represents that journey?

correspondence

Why does this map represent that journey?

Because there to exist a certain correspondence relation between features of the map and features of the world.

Discussion: Is this a complete answer? Or is there more to say?

Why?

Among all the ways in which features of the map do or might correspond to features of the world,
only some
(maybe just one)
determine what the map represents.

because misrepresentation is possible
Why does this correspondence relation determine what that map represents?
In the case of maps, we might think that it is a kind of stipulation. The person or organisation which creates the map introduces a stipulation about what the map represents.
Our question is one that famous philosophers have been asking for a while ... I want to start by asking you to read these quotes (see handout) and think about them. OBJECTIVE 1 : let’s try to understand them
\section{The Question’s History}

‘there are these objects out there. Here is the mind/brain, carrying on its thinking/computing. How do the thinker’s symbols ... get into a unique correspondence with objects and sets out there?’

\citep[p.~51]{Putnam:1981sw}

Putnam, 1981 p. 51

‘the implication of the thinking situation is of some ‘correspondence’ ... the problem of its nature and valid determination remains the central question of any theory of thinking’

\citep[p.~200]{Dewey:1907ka}

Dewey, 1907 p. 200

‘That truth is the correspondence of a representation with its object is, as Kant says, merely the nominal definition of it. ... But what does this correspondence or reference of the sign, to its object, consist in?’

\citep[p.~390/5.553]{Peirce:1906gu}

Peirce, 1906 p. 390/5.553

Now I think you understand what Peirce is saying